film clips of people experiencing and expressing discrete emotions (happiness, sadness, and anger) to young and old adults. The "context-rich" films were presented with sound, so that the participants were able to process visual and audio information as well as the content of what the protagonists said. The context-poor films were presented without sound. We consider the context-poor films as similar to the typical emotion recognition task in that they provide only one type of information, that is, visual information. The context-rich films are more similar to real-life situations and presumably of higher external validity.
Our second prediction referred to the role of cognitive resources in emotion recognition. We predicted that the effects of basic cognitive processes on emotion recognition would be especially evident in context-poor tasks. More specifically, the availability of cognitive resources would (a) be associated with higher emotion recognition performance in our context-poor film tasks and (b) explain age differences in emotion recognition performance in those tasks. Given that motivational processes are thought to play a substantial role in performance when the tasks are meaningful and relevant (e.g., Hess et al., 2001) , we expected that neither individual differences nor age-related differences in cognitive resources would play a significant role in emotion recognition as assessed by our context-rich film tasks. To test our predictions, we assessed logical reasoning as a measure of cognitive mechanics. Cognitive mechanics refer to basic information processing functions that show substantial age-related decline throughout adulthood and old age (e.g., Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006; Salthouse, 2004) .
Little evidence supports the idea that emotion recognition is improved when the observer and the observed are of similar ages (Borod et al., 2004; Ebner & Johnson, 2009; Moreno, Borod, Welkowitz, & Alpert, 1993 ; but see Malatesta, Izard, Culver, & Nicolich, 1987) . Given that this is the first study that varied the context richness of the emotion recognition tasks, we investigated this issue in an explorative manner. Therefore, we presented to our young and old participants films with either young or old target persons.
Method

Participants
To reduce the complexity of the design, all participants and film protagonists were women. The sample comprised 83 women. The 48 younger women (19-31 years; M = 23.33 years; SD = 3.38 years) were students at the University of Leipzig and participated for course credits. The 35 older women (61-94 years; M = 70.37 years; SD = 8.83 years) were recruited via newspaper, Internet, and face-to-face interviews and participated in exchange for monetary compensation. Differences between the two age groups were found in marital status (all single women belonged to the younger age group, whereas almost all divorced and all widowed women belonged to the older age group) and employment status (all younger adults were students, whereas almost all older adults were retired). Consistent with past evidence (e.g., Baltes et al., 2006) , there was a significant negative age group difference in logical reasoning which was assessed by the first 18 items of the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998; F (1,81) = 161.31, p < .01). The APM, one of the most common language-free tests of logical reasoning, requires participants to complete a series of black and white patterns where one piece is missing in each item. Answers are presented in a multiple-choice format. All sample characteristics are depicted in Table 1 .
Film Stimuli
Film clips were recorded in our laboratory at the University of Leipzig. The film protagonists were recruited from university courses and via newspaper. In individual sessions, the protagonists were asked to remember a time when they felt sadness, anger, or happiness. For each emotion, they were instructed to describe the situation and were helped in focusing on the moment at which the target emotion was felt strongly. The protagonists were videotaped while they relived the target emotion (for a similar procedure, see Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991) . Several days after this first session, the film protagonists returned to the laboratory to view the edited video recordings. Directly after each film clip, the protagonists reported how they had felt using a list of nine emotional adjectives (the same list was used by the participants; for details, see below). Protagonists' self-reports indicate that the target emotions were experienced strongly (all ratings were greater than 4; the response format ranged from 0 = not at all to 6 = extremely).
The present film stimuli were chosen out of a pool of 256 initially produced film clips in accordance with the following three criteria: (a) the protagonists' self-reported emotions fit the topic they were talking about (e.g., they mainly reported sadness when talking about a sad episode), (b) the protagonists' facial expressive behavior fit the topic they were talking about (e.g., they mainly showed sadness when talking about a sad episode), and (c) the protagonists' description of the situation did not contain any direct verbal expression of her feelings. In order to be able to present as many film clips as possible to our participants and to avoid ceiling effects in emotion recognition scores, the duration of each film clip was only 15 s. The chosen film protagonists were four younger (24, 25, 28, and 29 years) and four older women (60, 77, 82 , and 85 years), who each provided six different film clips-three clips (referring to three target emotions of sadness, anger, and happiness) for each of the two conditions (context poor and context rich).
Procedures and Design
Participants were tested in age-homogeneous groups of three to five persons. It was explained to participants that, after filling in a short demographic questionnaire, they would watch several short film clips. The films and all subsequent instructions were shown on 13-inch MacBooks. For the whole testing session, the experimenter, who was blind to the prediction, stayed in the room. The experimental session comprised two sets that were presented in a fixed order, that is, all participants viewed the context-poor clips first and the context-rich films subsequently. Within each set, the 24 films were presented in randomized order. Participants rated the emotions of the respective protagonist (target) after each film clip. At the end of the experimental session, the participants completed the APM and were then debriefed by the experimenter. (We decided not to alternate the presentation order of the two blocks to minimize training and/or familiarity effects, which are likely to be much stronger if participants view the to be observed targets in the contextrich condition first.)
Dependent Variable: Emotion Recognition
After each film, participants rated the intensity of the target's emotions using a list of nine emotional adjectives ("anxious," "sad," "happy," "angry," "surprised," "proud," "hostile," "disgusted," and "ashamed"). The response scale of this adjective list ranged from 0 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). Given that the targets and the participants rated the films with the same list of emotions, we were able to compute profile correlations as an indicator of accuracy (e.g., Ambady & Gray, 2002) . Participants' emotion recognition performance was computed as intraclass correlation between the participants' other ratings of the targets' emotions and the targets' self-ratings of their own emotions. All intraclass correlation coefficients were r to Z transformed to be normally distributed for subsequent analyses (Fisher, 1956) .
Results
Age Differences in Emotion Recognition: Overall Analyses
Age differences in emotion recognition were tested via a 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 multivariate repeated measures analysis of variance (MANOVA). Age of the participants (young vs. old) served as a between-subjects factor. Within-subjects factors were condition (context poor vs. context rich), age of target (young vs. old), and emotion (sadness vs. anger vs. happiness). Participants' emotion recognition scores served as dependent variables. For the present analyses, the emotion recognition scores were aggregated across the eight targets to build 12 scales, each indicating the ability to recognize one of the three emotions (sadness, anger, and happiness) of the young and the old targets in each of the two conditions (context poor and context rich). Cronbach's alphas for the 12 scales ranged from a = .24 to a = .61 (M = .38). F values were computed on the basis of Wilks' lambda. To isolate changes in particular outcomes, the overall MANOVA was followed by parallel univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The partial eta squares representing the portion of explained variance in the dependent variable are reported for each significant effect.
The overall MANOVA for the emotion recognition scores revealed significant main effects for age of the participants, F (1,81) = 14.36, p < .01, h 2 = .15, condition, F (1,81) = 522.11, p < .01, h 2 = .87, age of target, F (1,81) = 45.86, p < .01, h 2 = .36, and emotion, F (2,162) = 264.86, p < .01, h 2 = .77. The predicted interaction between age of the participants and condition was not significant, F (1,81) = 1.37, p = .245, h 2 = .02; however, the three-way interaction between age of the participants, condition, and emotion was significant, F (2,162) = 3.36, p < .05, h 2 = .04. Furthermore, significant interactions between age of the participants and age of target, F (1,81) = 24.99, p < .01, h 2 = .24, as well as between condition and age of target, F (1,81) = 36.70, p < .01, h 2 = .31, were evident. These two-way interactions were further qualified by a significant three-way interaction between age of the participants, condition, and age of target, F (1,81) = 14.38, p <. 01, h 2 = .15,. No other interaction effects were significant.
Follow-up analyses of the significant main effects revealed that (a) the younger participants performed at a higher level than the older participants (younger adults, M = 0.71, SD = 0.12; older adults, M = 0.59, SD = 0.16), (b) emotion recognition performance was lower in the contextpoor condition than in the context-rich condition (context poor, M = 0.48, SD = 0.14; context rich, M = 0.84, SD = 0.18), (c) younger targets were rated more accurately than 
Age Differences in Emotion Recognition: The Effect of Context Information
To explore the interaction effect between age of the participants, condition, and emotion, we conducted separate multivariate follow-up ANOVAs for the different emotions under both conditions. The analyses showed that a significant interaction between age and condition only occurred for happiness recognition, F (1,81) = 4.84, p < .05, h 2 = .06, whereas for sadness and anger recognition interactions between age and condition were not significant, sadness, F (1,81) = 0.04, p = .850, h 2 = .00; anger, F (1,81) = 0.62, p = .435, h 2 = .01. Inspection of the significant interaction between age and condition for happiness recognition revealed that younger participants performed significantly better than older participants in the context-poor condition, F (1,81) = 8.45, p < .01, h 2 = .09. However, this advantage was not evident in the context-rich condition, F (1,81) = 0.28, p = .598, h 2 = .00. Table 2 and Figure 1 depict the younger and older participants' emotion recognition scores separately for the two conditions and the three emotions. As seen, the largest performance increase from Condition 1 to Condition 2 was achieved by older participants when recognizing happiness (difference = .46). Inspection of the means and standard deviations, as depicted in Table 2 , did not suggest ceiling effects in the recognition of happiness.
Age Differences in Emotion Recognition: The Effect of Age of Target
To explore the interaction effect between age of the participants, condition, and age of target, we conducted separate multivariate follow-up ANOVAs for both conditions. A significant interaction between age of the participants and age of target emerged only under the context-rich condition, F (1,81) = 32.62, p < .01, h 2 = .29. As can be seen in Figure 2 , under the context-rich condition, younger participants outperformed older participants when recognizing the emotions of young targets, F (1,81) = 19.41, p < .01, h 2 = .19. This advantage was not evident when recognizing the emotions of older targets; younger participants' performance declined and approximated that of older participants, F (1,81) = 0.50, p = .481, h 2 = .01. Under the context-poor condition, the interaction between age of the participants and age of target was not significant, F (1,81) = 2.37, p = .127, h 2 = .03. Independent of the target's age, younger participants performed better than older participants, F (1,81) = 23.15, p < .01, h 2 = .22.
The Effects of Cognitive Resources on Emotion Recognition
Main effects of logical reasoning on emotion recognition.-To test our prediction that logical reasoning would have a stronger effect on emotion recognition under the context-poor versus the context-rich condition, we first explored zero-order correlations between logical reasoning and emotion recognition separately for the three emotions (sadness, anger, and happiness) and the two conditions (context poor and context rich). Contrary to our prediction, the associations between logical reasoning and emotion recognition were emotion specific rather than context specific. That is, under both conditions, logical reasoning was positively associated with sadness recognition (context poor, r = .32, p < .01; context rich, r = .22, p < .05) and anger recognition (context poor, r = .43, p < .01; context rich, r = .47, p < .01), but there were no significant correlations between logical reasoning and happiness recognition (context poor, r = .14, p = .218; context rich, r = .01, p = .900).
To further test the effects of logical reasoning, we conducted an MANOVA with the between-subject factor logical reasoning (top 33% vs. bottom 33%) and the two within-subject factors, condition (context poor vs. context rich) and emotion (sadness vs. anger vs. happiness). The overall MANOVA for the emotion recognition scores revealed significant main effects for logical reasoning, F (1,59) = 12.33, p < .01, h 2 = .17, condition, F (1,59) = 337.22, p < .01, h 2 = .85, and emotion, F (2,118) = 288.65, p < .01, h 2 = .79. In addition and consistent with the correlation analyses, a significant interaction effect of logical reasoning and emotion emerged, F (2,118) = 4.14, p < .05, h 2 = .07. In contrast to our prediction, interaction effects involving condition were not significant.
Follow-up analyses of the significant main effect of logical reasoning revealed that the top 33% of the participants performed significantly better than the bottom 33% (bottom 33%, M = 0.57, SD = 0.16; top 33%, M = 0.70, SD = 0.13). To explore the interaction between logical reasoning and emotion, we conducted separate follow-up ANOVAs for the different emotions. These analyses revealed that logical reasoning predicted the recognition of sadness and anger, sadness, F (1,59) = 8.76, p < .01, h 2 = .13; bottom 33%, M = 0.46, SD = 0.18; top 33%, M = 0.58, SD = 0.14; anger, F (1,59) = 40.69, p < .01, h 2 = .41; bottom 33%, M = 0.34, SD = 0.13; top 33%, M = 0.55, SD = 0.12, but not happiness, F (1,59) = 1.01, p = .320, h 2 = .02; bottom 33%, M = 0.91, SD = 0.25; top 33%, M = 0.97, SD = 0.23.
Logical reasoning as a mediator of the effects of age on emotion recognition.-The influence of logical reasoning on age differences in emotion recognition was tested via two multivariate repeated measures analyses of covariance for the context-poor and context-rich conditions. As in the main analysis, participants' emotion recognition scores were the dependent variables, age of the participants (young vs. old) served as a between-subjects factor, and emotion (sadness vs. anger vs. happiness) was the within-subjects factor. Logical reasoning was entered as continuous covariate into the analysis. Again, contrary to our prediction that the effects of logical reasoning would be limited to the context-poor task, both analyses showed that the effects of age of the participants on emotion recognition were reduced after control of logical reasoning (context-poor: h 2 = .22, p < .01; h 2 controlled for logical reasoning = .08, p < .05; context-rich: h 2 = .07, p < .05; h 2 controlled for logical reasoning = .01, p = .401).
Taken together, contrary to our prediction, the present findings generally suggest that the effects of logical reasoning are emotion specific rather than context specific. That is, logical reasoning predicted sadness and anger recognition but not happiness recognition. In addition, there was no evidence for our prediction that the meditational effects of logical reasoning would be limited to the context-poor condition. That is, under both conditions, the effects of age on emotion recognition were mediated by logical reasoning.
Discussion
Overall and consistent with previous research (cf. Ruffman et al., 2008) , younger adults outperformed older adults in recognizing sadness, anger, and happiness. Also consistent with past work, happiness was easier to recognize than anger or sadness (cf. Isaacowitz et al., 2007) . Although happiness was easier to recognize than the two negative emotions, age differences in emotion recognition were not moderated by the specific emotion considered. That is, in contrast to past work, we did not observe less age deficit for happiness versus anger and sadness recognition. One reason for this inconsistency between the present and past studies may be the absence of the typical ceiling effects in younger adults' happiness recognition in the present data (e.g., Calder et al., 2003; Williams et al., 2006) . Furthermore, younger and older adults were more accurate if the emotion recognition task was context rich versus context-poor. This finding is consistent with past studies conducted in the field of personality and social psychology and extends these past studies by studying older adults in addition to young adults (Gesn & Ickes, 1999; Hall & Schmid Mast, 2007; Zaki et al., 2009) .
Our main prediction, namely, older adults in particular will profit from contextually rich emotion recognition tasks so that age differences in emotion recognition are minimized, was only supported when the task was to recognize happiness. When the task was to recognize anger and sadness, negative age differences remained unchanged throughout the present two conditions. We interpret this evidence as support for Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST; e.g., Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) . SST states that as people become older, they are increasingly motivated to process positive information selectively. Research on such positivity effects in attention and memory (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2005) would certainly suggest that positively, as opposed to negatively, valenced material particularly motivates older adults to make use of and process contextual information and, thus, optimize their emotion recognition skills. The present findings are consistent with the idea that only if the to-be-processed information is positive will older adults profit from the provision of context-rich and ecologically valid tasks to a greater degree than young adults do.
Seen from the perspective of cognitive or social cognitive training research, the present pattern of findings, namely, that older participants profited from the context-rich tasks to the same degree as the younger participants (for sadness and anger recognition) or even more so (for happiness recognition), is quite surprising. The effectiveness of interventions is typically smaller with older adults as compared with younger adults (for review: Baltes et al., 2006 ; see however Staudinger & Baltes, 1996) . The present evidence clearly speaks against the idea that age-related deficits in emotion recognition are irreversible (e.g., Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) . Rather, the findings are consistent with the view that emotion recognition can be improved by relatively simple environmental manipulations, that is, by varying the contextual richness of the task or the valence of the to be recognized emotion.
The Role of Cognitive Resources in Emotion Recognition
Consistent with the idea that emotion recognition is an effortful task that requires cognitive resources, logical reasoning-present study's indicator of the cognitive mechanics-predicted individual differences in sadness and anger recognition. In addition and also consistent with the present predictions, logical reasoning mediated the effects of age on emotion recognition. Two findings were unexpected, however.
The first one was that logical reasoning predicted sadness and anger recognition but not happiness recognition. One potential explanation for this finding refers to task difficulty. As reported previously, the happiness recognition task was significantly easier than the sadness and anger recognition tasks and, thus, may require fewer or no cognitive resources to be successfully solved. However, contrasting with this explanation, logical reasoning predicted sadness and anger recognition in both experimental conditions, although they greatly differed in difficulty level. Although the context-rich tasks were less difficult than the context-poor tasks, they still seemed to require cognitive resources. In addition, although the happiness recognition task was relatively easy, it still produced variance (i.e., the standard deviations of the happiness recognition scores did not significantly differ from the standard deviations of the sadness and anger recognition scores). An alternative explanation for the emotion-specific effects of logical reasoning refers to motivational processes. According to work in the context of SST, motivational processes have been shown to play a substantial role in affective information processing (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2005) . The happiness recognition task may have been highly motivationally engaging so that all participants-including those with relatively little resources-allocated a relatively large proportion of their cognitive resources to the task. Thus, the relatively high task motivation may have eliminated individual differences in the cognitive resources invested and, thus, in the effect of logical reasoning on happiness recognition. Certainly, such positivity effects have been attributed to older rather than younger adults in past work (see Mather & Carstensen) . Future work is necessary to study the question of whether different mechanisms (motivational vs. cognitive) underlie the recognition of different emotions (positive vs. negative) in different age groups (young vs. old).
The second unexpected finding was that logical reasoning predicted emotion recognition in both conditions, that is, independently of whether the task was context poor or context rich. We take this evidence as further indication that the provision of contextually rich and relevant tasks per se may not be sufficient to enhance individuals' motivation to a degree that eliminates the effects of basic cognitive resources on emotion recognition.
The Age of the Observed Person
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a handful of studies that have investigated whether people are more accurate at recognizing emotions of people of their own rather than other age groups. These studies have used context-poor emotion recognition tasks and did not find an own-age advantage or other-age disadvantage in emotion recognition (Borod et al., 2004; Ebner & Johnson, 2009; Moreno et al., 1993; see Malatesta et al., 1987 for an exception). The present evidence is consistent with the former three studies in that a fit between participant and target age did not predict emotion recognition when working on the present contextpoor emotion recognition tasks.
In the context-rich condition, however, a significant interaction occurred between observer and target age, indicating that the younger participants' emotion recognition performance dropped to the level of older adults if they were to recognize an older target's emotions. Given that this effect was restricted to the context-rich condition, it is unlikely that it was primarily the outward appearance of the older targets that influenced younger participants' decline in emotion recognition. An alternative explanation refers to the age relevance of the events and experiences our targets were talking about. More specifically, younger participants might have been less motivated or less able to recognize the emotions of older targets because they talked about themes that were of little relevance or relatively unfamiliar to them. Although we could not test this idea directly with data from the present study, a follow-up analysis suggested that it was at least possible to tell the age of a target by simply processing the content of what she said. In the context of this analysis, a naïve rater was asked to read the 24 written transcripts of the context-rich condition (referring to the 24 targets' narratives) and indicate for each whether it was produced by a younger or older adult. Even though the length of the narratives was quite short (i.e., 15 s), our naïve rater was able to correctly classify 11 of the 12 transcripts from young targets and 10 of the 12 transcripts from older targets. Overall the rater assigned 87.5% of the transcripts correctly (Cohens k = .75). Future studies are necessary to investigate the question of whether the age relevance of the task will influence age differences in emotion recognition.
Limitations and Outlook
This study extended past work on age differences in emotion recognition by presenting emotion recognition tasks that differ in the degree to which they present the to-berecognized emotions as they are experienced and expressed under natural conditions. Although our context-rich films provided more information than the context-poor films, they obviously did not match real-life situations. In addition, the medium of the presentation (a 13-inch MacBook) was likely to be more familiar to the younger women as compared with the older women. Although the older women did not show or report any difficulties during the testing session, this familiarity might have influenced the recognition task.
A second limitation of the present study clearly refers to the present indicator of cognitive resources, that is, logical reasoning. Although logical reasoning is a highly valid and representative indicator of the cognitive mechanics (i.e., basic information processing functions), it will be important to assess the concept of cognitive resources in a more comprehensive manner in future studies and include, for example, working memory, perceptual speed, or inhibitory abilities as additional measures of cognitive mechanics (e.g., Baltes et al., 2006; Salthouse, 2004) .
A third task for future research will be to investigate the motivational mechanisms that interact with cognitive processes and together influence emotion recognition performance. This study proceeded from the idea that age differences in emotion recognition may be eliminated in contexts that older adults will find highly motivationally engaging. It would be interesting to test this idea more directly by having participants react to another's emotions on both levels: emotional and cognitive.
A fourth limitation of the present study refers to our focus on female targets and participants. This decision was made for pragmatic reasons and because we are not aware of past studies that would suggest systematic gender differences in emotion recognition (e.g., Isaacowitz et al., 2007; Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, & Levenson, 2005) . Nevertheless, potential gender differences should certainly be explored in future studies with female and male study participants as well as target persons.
Finally, future studies should examine more systematically the importance of different channels of emotion expression for emotion recognition. In this study, for example, the contents of a target's speech might be a major factor for identifying a certain emotion. To test this possibility, we asked two naïve raters to read the 24 transcribed verbal statements of our targets and then rate the intensity of the emotions conveyed in the text with the same emotion check list as our participants used. The raters' recognition scores, computed as profile correlations, were substantially lower than those of the participants (overall: raters = .26, participants = .66; young targets: raters = .33, participants = .71; old targets: raters = .19, participants =.60). This implies that, although the present verbal statements may have provided a certain amount of information about the emotions experienced by the participants, it certainly was not only the content but also the way it was presented that influenced the emotion ratings of our participants.
